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Size, Shape, and Color of Prescription Drugs:
What Scope of Protection?
INTRODUCTION
Prescription drugs play a critical role in modern medicine, com-
plementing the many other procedures and techniques used by
physicians to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent various illnesses or
conditions.' They have become an essential tool for the physician
in the administration of medical care."
Prescription drugs also have major economic consequences for
the American consumer.8 Yet, as captive consumers, patients have
little choice regarding which products they buy or what prices they
pay.4 Product choice has already been determined by the physician
when a prescription for a certain drug is written. The price of the
drug is heavily influenced by the degree of competition in the
pharmaceutical industry.
During the last twenty years, industry marketing practices have
been criticized as minimizing competition. Generic drugs hold the
promise of encouraging competition while reducing consumer costs
and maintaining high quality." The passage by many states of sub-
stitution laws has encouraged the growth of this generic drug in-
dustry. With the growth, however, many problems have arisen.
1. Congressional Research Service, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Sum-
mary and Analysis of Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Monopolies During
90th-91st Cong. 2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
2. Id.
3. Approximately $16 billion is spent annually on drugs, compared with $300 million in
1938. An average of nearly seven prescriptions was written for each American, totalling 1.5
billion prescriptions. Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1979, Report of the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, U.S. Senate, to accompany S. 1075, S. Rep. 96-321, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10-16(1979) [hereinfter cited as Report of the Committee on S.1075]. See
also 1972 Hearings, supra note 1.
4. 1972 Hearings, supra note 1.
5. The term "generic equivalent" is misleading. A generic name merely identifies the
specific active ingredient, e.g., penicillin. Almost no generic substances are suitable for
human use without being combined with various inert ingredients during the manufacturing
process. These additives, such as lubricants and binders, are not identified by the generic
term, but they can significantly influence the therapeutic effect of the drug. Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, Drug Bioequivalence Study Panel, Drug Bioequivalence 27 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as OTA Report].
6. In response to the movement to promote the use of generic drugs, laws permitting and
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One of the conflicts to emerge in this area is the "look-alike"
encouraging generic substitution have been enacted in many states. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§§ 08.80.010-.80-490 (Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1001 to 1061 (1979); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 4047.6 (West Supp. 1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-732 (1981); N.Y. EDUc. LAW §
6816-a (McKinney Supp. 1980).
For many years, most states have had anti-substitution laws prohibiting the substitution
of one drug for another in filling a prescription. For example, in 1972, forty-seven states had
antisubstitution laws. See Green, Welfare Losses from Monopoly in the Drug Industry: The
Oklahoma 'Antisubstitution' Law, 5 ANTrrRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 3, 108 (1972). Drug
manufacturers therefore aimed their advertising at physicians, hoping to influence them to
prescribe by brand-name thereby precluding pharmacists from substituting either another
brand-name drug or a generic. See Note, Consumer Protection and Prescription Drugs: The
Generic Substitution Laws, 67 Ky. L.J. 384, 390 (1978-79) [hereinfter cited as Generic Drug
Laws]. The advertising was successful; by 1972 approximately ninety percent of all prescrip-
tions were written for brand-names. See Note, Product Liability for Prescription Drugs -
The Effects of Generic Substitution on the Consumer and the Pharmacist, 23 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 887, 888 (1972). However, the cost of the advertising was reflected in the higher prices
of brand-name drugs and the use of generics seemed a good way to reduce costs to consum-
ers. See Generic Drug Laws, supra this note, at 390. Between 1972 and 1979, 31 states and
the District of Columbia repealed their anti-substitution laws and enacted various types of
laws permitting substitutions. Id. at 395. Most of these laws encourage the pharmacist to
substitute a lower cost "generic equivalent" and require that the consumer be notified of the
substitution. Id. at 404-405.
Drug substitution has been vigorously supported by federal agencies. In 1976, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (now Department of Health and Human Services)
adopted Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) Regulations which provide that the maximum
amounts reimbursed to persons covered by federal health programs, such as Medicare and
Medicaid, would be limited to the lowest costs at which "chemically-equivalent" drugs were
generally available, thus obligating the patient to pay the difference if his physician pre-
scribed a higher-priced brand-name. 45 CFR § 19.1-19.6 (1980). These regulations were im-
plemented despite the fact that a government drug study confirmed that significant varia-
tions in bioavailability could exist between drug products sharing the same physical and
chemical compositions. B. MacKimm, A Letter from the Publisher, MEDICAL WORLD NEws 9
(September 6, 1974).
The FTC, while not recommending any rulemaking proceeding at the present time, has
prepared a Model Product Selection Act in conjunction with the FDA to help the states
frame effective substitution laws. McCarey, Generic Substitution Policy, 34 FooD, DRUG,
COSM. L.J. 103, 104 (1979) [hereinafter cited as McCarey]. In addition, it has recently
launched a multi-media campaign aimed at encouraging consumers to ask pharmacists
about using generic drugs. 43 FDC REP. 17, at T & G-1 (Apr. 27, 1981).
In 1978, the FDA lent the full weight of its support to the substitution movement. The
FDA assisted the state of New York, which had passed substitution legislation, in preparing
a list of approximately 2,500 generic drug products considered to be "therapeutically
equivalent" to their higher-priced brand-name counterparts. Ball, Jr., Government versus
Trademarks: Today - Pharmaceuticals, Realemon and Formica - Tommorrow?, 68 TRADE-
MARK REP. 471 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ball]. The FDA was careful to emphasize that
the term "therapeutically equivalent" should not be confused with "interchangeability,"
that the two terms were not synonymous, and that the agency would not certify their inter-
changeability. When the New York list was published, however, it was titled "Safe, Effective
and Interchangeable Prescription Drugs." Id. at 479 n. 37.
Unfortunately, many of these substitution laws have not been as successful in reducing
costs to consumers as had been hoped and forecast. A consensus seems to be developing
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issue:7 whether it is legal to allow generics drug manufacturers to
copy the size, shape, and color of brand name prescription drugs or
whether such copying constitutes unfair competition, false designa-
tion of origin, or counterfeiting.' Controversy and confusion over
this question continue unabated in the courts," in Congress," in
among both government officials who most vigorously supported generic drugs and organ-
ized consumer groups that consumer savings from generic substitution have been disap-
pointing. A survey reported in the Washington Post in July, 1980, revealed that substitution
laws in Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia have provided only marginal sav-
ings for consumers and major profits for drugstores. Washington Post, July 28, 1980, at Al,
col. 2. An evaluation of the New York generic substitution law revealed that savings were
not passed on to consumers in 29% of the post-law purchases of generic substitutions and
that extensive comparison shopping was required to assure maximal savings. Francetic,
Lasagna, Weintraub and Karch, Prescription Prices Under the New York Generic Substitu-
tion Laws, 92 ANN. INT. MED. 3, at 419-23 (March, 1980).
However, as more consumers, physicians and pharmacists become familiar with the op-
tions provided by these laws and the possible cost-savings of generic products, more compet-
itive pricing among brand-name and generic manufacturers will hopefully follow.
For further discussion, see Ruggieri, Manufacturers View of Generic Substitution Legis-
lation, 34 FOOD, DRUG, CosM. L.J. 108, 111 (1979).
7. An example of a look-alike problem is illustrated by Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby
Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979). Plaintiff Ives developed the drug cyclandelate, which
is marketed under the brand-name Cyclospasmol. It is available in two dosages: one is in a
pale blue capsule and the other is in a red and blue capsule. Defendant manufacturers cop-
ied and marketed their version of cyclandelate in capsules, using colors essentially identical
to Ives. The problem is not defendant manufacturers' copying the drug itself, but in selling
it in the same capsule shape and colors as the Ives product.
The look-alike problem has recently emerged with serious consequences in another con-
text. Distributors are selling tablets and capsules colored to make them look like amphet-
amines and other controlled substances, but which in fact contain dangerously high levels of
caffeine and antihistamines. These look-alikes have been responsible for killing six women
and teenagers in Illinois in less than a year. Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 29, 1981, at 12, col. 1.
8. A drug ordinarily has three names: the chemical name which describes the structure
of the drug in chemical terms; a generic name which indicates the chemical class to which
the drug belongs; and the brand-name which is the name adopted by the manufacturer and
registered as a trademark. See REMINGTON'S PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCES 1309 (15th ed. 1975).
The brand-name manufacturer does all the research and development of the drug and the
so-called generic manufacturer uses that data and manufactures a generic product.
9. Rogers and Kahan, Recent Developments Regarding Look-Alike Drugs, 35 FOOD,
DRUG, CosM. L.J. 4, 5 (Jan. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments].
10. See SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.
1980); Ives Laboratores, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979); A.H. Robins &
Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Pennwalt Corp. v.
Zenith Laboratories, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Marion Laboratories, Inc. v.
Michigan Pharmacal Corp., 338 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 473
F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973). See also 578 SCRIP: WORLD PHARMACEUTICAL NEWS 11 (Apr. 1,
1981) (noting that Schering Corp. filed a series of trademark infringement and unfair com-
petition suits involving look-alike versions of its brand name drug, Drixoral); 30 WEEKLY
PHARMACY REP. 17 (Apr. 27, 1981) (Ives Labs brings suit against Zenith Labs and 15 other
firms in N.J. Federal court to enjoin them from marketing look-alike versions of its brand
name drug, Cyclospasmol).
11. See Report of the Committee on S.1075, supra note 3, at 10-16. (History and pur-
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various government agencies,"2 and in the pharmaceutical indus-
try.18 The issue is a difficult one because there are valid arguments
on both sides.1 4 The policies designed to encourage competition di-
rectly collide with policies in favor of consumer protection and en-
couragement of new product development. 5
This article will trace the historical background of the "look-
alike" controversy, including the impact of two Supreme Court un-
fair competition cases 6 on the state and common law of trademark
and unfair competition. The potential statutory protection for size,
shape, and color in the Lanham Act will be discussed. Finally, the
public policies in favor of trademark protection and against such
protection will be surveyed.
poses of the proposed drug regulation reform. bill); 125 Congressional Record S 13468-13469
(daily ed. Sept. 26, 1979) (discussion on the Senate floor of an amendment to the counterfeit
drug provision of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); 43 FDC REP. 23, at T & G-2 (June 8,
1981) (Sen. Hatch (R-Utah), Senate Labor and Human Resources Comm. chairperson, reit-
erated his position on look-alike drugs, asserting that they prevent consumers from knowing
what product they are getting and that they can endanger patient health and safety).
12. See 416 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-5 & D-1 (Feb. 15, 1979) (Dept. of
Justice files amicus curiae brief on behalf of defendants in Ives Laboratories look-alike case,
urging the Second Circuit not to permit exclusive rights in the size, shape, and color of
unpatented drugs); 464 SCRIP: WORLD PHARAMCEUTIcAL NEWS 12 (Feb. 20, 1980) (Dept. of
Justice files amicus curiae brief in support of Premo Pharmaceuticals' appeal against a dis-
trict court's ruling that bars Premo from marketing its generic look-alike drug); 43 FDC
REP. 17, at T.& G - 1 (April 27, 1981) (FTC scheduled to begin a generic drug substitution
law study during 1982); 42 FDC REP. 43, at T & G-11 (Oct. 27, 1980) (FDA does not take
the position of promoting all generic drugs as being safe and equivalent to their brand-name
counterparts).
13. See 578 SCRIP: WORLD PHARMAcEuTxcAL NEWS 10 (Apr. 1, 1981) (the National As-
soc. of Pharmaceutical Mfrs. (NAPM) recommends that the FDA standardize the size,
shape and color of all drugs, while the Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Assoc. (PMA) argues that these
attributes are the principle guides to a product's identity and manufacturer).
14. Remark of former Food & Drug Administration Commissioner, Jere Goyan. 41 FDC
REP. 3 (Sept. 10, 1979).
15. See Report of the Atty. General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
Economic Indicia of Competition & Monopoly 317-39 (1955), reprinted in part in M. HAN-
DLER, TRADE REGULATION 67 (4th ed. 1967) (the more homogeneous the product of competi-
tors the more easily buyers can switch from one competitor's product to another; therefore
the wider the market, the greater the degree of competition in it); Pattishall, Trademarks
and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV. 967 (1952) [hereinfter cited as Pattishall]
(competition requires differentiation between products). See also Norwich Pharmacal Co. v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1959) ("Distaste for sharp or unethical
business practices has often caused the courts to lose sight of the fundamental consideration
in the law of unfair competition - protection of the public.")
16. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW PROTECTION
The look-alike controversy has developed in suits alleging trade-
mark infringement and/or unfair competition under common law
and state statutes.17 Early cases reveal judicial antipathy to protec-
tion for color or shape. Protection has traditionally been accorded
only to marks identifying the producer and the court has allowed
features of a competitor's product which were primarily associated
with the product, rather than the producer, to be copied at will,
requiring only that the copier identify the product as its own. 18 In
denying protection to size, shape, and color, however, courts relied
on the color-depletion theory, believing that the limited number of
colors and shapes risked appropriation by a few producers, thus
creating monopolies and inhibiting competition. 19 A general rule
17. While there are distinctions between trademark law and unfair competition law, the
law of trademarks is in fact but a part of the greater law of unfair competition. See Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1915). See also J. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22 (4th ed. 1924); Recent Develop-
ments, supra note 9, at 5.
Trademark protection is derived from the common law; today the common law still re-
mains the basic source of doctrines designed to protect trademarks even where trademark
registration statutes have been enacted. E. KITcH AND H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF
THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 283-84 (2d ed. 1979). Under the common law, trademarks come to
signify those marks or devices adopted and used by a producer which were arbitrary and
distinctive enough to identify the producer's goods. Id. at 288. These requirements have
been codified in the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1157 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as the Lanham Act].
For a history of trademark doctrines, see F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS (1925); Paster, TRADEMARKS - THEIR EARLY HISTORY, 59
TRADEMARK REP. 551 (1969).
The rule of unfair competition in the product simulation context has been stated as: "The
copying of (1) nonfunctional features of an article which (2) have acquired secondary mean-
ing, with (3) a resulting confusion as to source or origin, constitutes unfair competition and
will be enjoined by the courts. This is the majority rule reduced to its simplist formula.
(citations omitted)" Pollack, Unfair Trading by Product Simulation: Rule or Rankle?, 23
OHIO ST. L.J 74, 76 (1962).
18. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
19. See Leschen Rope Co. v. Broderick, 201 U.S. 166 (1906) (courts don't favor mono-
polizing color); Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1950) (no trademark
rights attached at common law to shape of goods); Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175
F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1949) (if one manufacturer allowed to monopolize red, others will monopo-
lize the rest and the list of colors will soon run out); Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match
Co., 142 F. 727 (6th Cir. 1906) (only a few primary colors and, if protected here, the rest will
soon be appropriated); Harrington v. Libby, 11 F. Cas. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1877) (shape not rec-
ognized as a trademark).
In 1958 Haig and Haig was allowed to register their pinched-shaped whiskey bottle as a
trademark. Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (1958). The Commissioner based
the decision solely on the fact that the bottle had acquired secondary meaning. Id. at 230-
31.
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emerged that size, shape, and color would be protected only if
those features were nonfunctional and had acquired secondary
meaning. 20 Both elements must be shown to obtain trademark pro-
tection. These trademark concepts have filtered into the law of un-
fair competition,2 1 as well, and must be shown to claim this
protection.
Functional features include those which affect their purpose, ac-
tion or performance, or the facility or economy of processing, han-
dling or using them.2 2 The nonfunctionality requirement prevents
a producer from gaining the equivalent of a perpetual common law
monopoly or patent.23 Functional features, therefore, unless other-
wise protected,24 may be copied at will.
Secondary meaning, although an elusive concept, may be de-
scribed as a word or device initially considered to be merely de-
scriptive of a product, but which, through exclusive use and pro-
The "color depletion" argument has been found unpersuasive in recent cases, as well. See
Marion Laboratories, Inc. v. Michigan Pharmacal Corp., 338 F. Supp. 762, 768 (E.D. Mich.
1972) ("Plaintiff introduced a color wheel provided by Eli Lilly & Co. to illustrate the color
combinations available for capsules from which it appears that as many as 12,000 color com-
binations are available."); Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d
Cir. 1979) ("[An endless number of color combinations was available to the defendants.").
20. See also William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924) (chocolate
ingredient in quinine product not nonfunctional); Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959) (pink color of Pepto Bismol may be functional for its
psychological effect); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957) (size and color
found functional); Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190
(9th Cir. 1953) (heart shape of amphetamine tablet found to be nonfunctional and to have
acquired secondary meaning); Smith, Kline and French Laboratories v. Heart Pharmaceuti-
cal Corp., 90 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (shape and color of drug nonfunctional and had
acquired secondary meaning).
The yellow of sulphur, the blue of cupric sulfate, and the vivid red of mercuric iodide are
inherently colored, however, and cannot be appropriated as trademarks. Cooper, Trademark
Aspects of Pharmaceutical Design, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Cooper.].
21. See Note, Developments in the Law - Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 911
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Competitive Torts]; Comment, Trade Regulation: Legal Protec-
tion of Commercial Design, 1959 Wis. L. REV. ,652, 655.
22.. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW TORTS § 742, Comment a (1938). See also Pagliero v. Wal-
lace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952) (nonfunctional means not important to a prod-
uct's commercial success); Filter Dynamics Int'l., Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d
299, 311-12, 311 N.E. 2d 386 (1974). (functional features include those which contribute to
the efficiency or economy of a product and those which contribute to the product's utility,
durability or effectiveness).
23. Treece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stifel and Compco Cases, 32 U. CR. L.
REV. 80, 90-91 (1964) [hereinfter cited as Treece].
24. One source of protection is the patent laws, which can be found in chapter 35 of the
United States Code.
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motion has come to indicate the source of a product.28 Where a
particular word or device has come to indicate the source of a
product, it is possible that consumers will be confused if another
manufacturer were allowed to use the same word or device on its
product. Protection of products that have secondary meaning,
therefore, reduces potential consumer confusion. Generally, only a
likelihood of confusion, and not proof of actual confusion, is re-
quired to satisfy a showing of secondary meaning' 6 .
Even where nonfunctionality and secondary meaning/likelihood
of confusion could not be shown, courts have granted protection
where plaintiff could show that defendant had engaged in selling
its goods as those of plaintiff, referred to as "palming off.' 7 In the
prescription drug context, "palming off" has been found not only
where a generic manufacturer actively persuaded pharmacists to
covertly substitute its product for the brand name drug, but even
where the mere suggestion to substitute was made.' 8
In 1964 the Supreme Court decided two cases which have had a
profound effect on the common law of unfair competition. In
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,' 9 Stiffel had obtained design
patents on its floor-to-ceiling pole lamp. When Sears marketed a
substantially identical lamp at a much lower price, Stiffel brought
suit against Sears for patent infringement under federal law and
for unfair competition under Illinois law. The district court held
the patents invalid, and therefore did not discuss the federal claim.
The court continued, however, to find that Sears had violated the
Illinois law of unfair competition because the lamps were substan-
tially identical to Stiffel's lamps and confusion was likely to oc-
25. Swenson, Property Rights in the Color and Shape of Capsules, 32 FOOD, DRUG,
CosM. L.J. 361, 364-65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Swenson].
26. See Queen Mfg. Co. v. Isaac Ginsberg & Bros., Inc., 25 F.2d 284, 288 (8th Cir. 1928);
Pollack, supra note 17, at 81-82.
27. Recent Developments, supra note 9, at 6; see Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1959) (courts of equity will enjoin such practices as
constitute palming off, actual deception or appropriation of another's property.)
28. See Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957) (although no proof of actual
palming off, defendants had at least made it possible for druggists to substitute); Smith
Kline & French Laboratories, Inc. v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1946) (defendant's
salesmen had suggested to pharmacists that its product could be substituted for plaintiff's
product and the court recognized this as an unfair practice); Martin H. Smith Co. v. Ameri-
can Pharmaceutical Co., 270 N.Y.2d 184, 200 N.E. 779 (1936) (defendant's salesmen had
been writing a "similar to" statement referring to plaintiff's look-alike drug; the court
granted an injunction against the marketing of this drug based on this inducement factor).
29. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
1981]
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cur.80 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that, under Illinois
law, there was no need to show that Sears had been "palming off"
its lamps as Stiffel's; Stiffel only had to show a likelihood of confu-
sion as to the source of the product.3'
The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Illinois law of unfair
competition incompatible with the federal patent law and, there-
fore, preempted.32 The Court held that where federal patent law
permits copying, the mere inability of the public to distinguish be-
tween two identical articles is not sufficient to support an injunc-
tion against copying or an award for damages for copying under
state laws of unfair competition." The Court specifically stated,
however, that a State may require labeling or other precautions to
prevent consumers from being misled as to source." In addition,
the Court recognized that a State may protect trademarks, labels,
or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods to prevent others
from imitating these features and misleading purchasers". How-
ever, the Sears Court would allow any product itself not protected
by federal patent laws to be freely copied as long as it was properly
labeled.
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 6 was decided the
same day as Sears. In that case, Day-Brite, a manufacturer of
fluorescent lighting fixtures, had obtained design patents on a light
fixture. When Compco began marketing very similar fixtures, Day-
Brite brought suit alleging patent infringement under federal law
and unfair competition under Illinois law. The District Court, as in
Sears, held the patents invalid, but found Compco guilty of unfair
competition under Illinois law where Day-Brite's unique design
identified it to the trade and the concurrent sale of the two prod-
ucts was likely to cause confusion.8 7 The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, on the ground that there was substantial evidence to sup-
port a likelihood of confusion, which was sufficient to support a
finding of unfair competition under Illinois law.38
The Supreme Court reversed, again finding the Illinois law of
30. 376 U.S. at 226.
31. 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
32. 376 U.S. at 225.
33. Id. at 232.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
37. 376 U.S. at 235.
38. 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
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unfair competition preempted by federal patent law. 9 The Court
again held that, although the trial court had found that the design
had acquired secondary meaning, the design could be copied at will
if it was not entitled to patent or other federal statutory protec-
tion.40 The Court seemed to go further than they had in Sears,
stating that even if a design feature is nonfunctional and possesses
secondary meaning, it is insufficient to furnish a basis for prohibit-
ing copying.4 ' The Court also stated that, although a state may not
prohibit the copying and selling of unpatented articles, it may re-
quire producers who make and sell copies to label accurately as to
source.
42
The sweeping language of these two decisions has been a source
of much comment.4 8 These cases were thought to overrule much of
the traditional law of unfair trade. Sears and Compco were gener-
ally perceived as having a drastic effect on the entire law of unfair
competition.4'
Lower courts, however, have generally been reluctant to apply
Sears and Compco rigidly to non-patent cases and, relying on two
subsequent Supreme Court cases,'" have tended to limit their ap-
39. 376 U.S. at 234.
40. Id. at 238.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See generally Treece, supra note 23; Leeds, The Impact of Sears and Compco, 55
TRADEMARK REP. 188 (1965); Comment, The Impact of Sears and Compco on Federal
Trademark and Patent Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 91 (1969); Zammit, The Ghost of Sears-
Compco is Finally Laid to Rest (Or Is It?), 3 HOFSTRA L. RE v. 37 (1975); Dannay, The
Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 67 TRADEMARK REP.
132 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Dannay].
44. See, e.g., 3 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETMrON, TRADEMARKS AND MO-
NOPOLIES, § 60.4(a) (3d ed. 1969): "These startlingly disappointing companion decisions so
revolutionized our thinking with respect to the law of unfair competition that almost every
one of its previously accepted premises must now be re-examined." See also Derenberg,
Product Simulation: A Right or A Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1192 (1964): "The roof had
seemingly fallen in on a vast structure of federal and state precedents laboriously built up
since the days of the Court's famous decision in the International News case."
45. Goldstein v. State of California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). In Goldstein, which dealt with the category of sound recordings
which had been left altogether "unattended" by Congress, the Court found insufficient basis
upon which to find a Congressional intent to preempt state protection of the recordings.
Sears and Compco were distinguished on the ground that those cases dealt with the estab-
lishment of uniform federal standards of patentability. Kewanee held that a state's law of
trade secrets was not preempted by the federal patent laws because patent law does not deal
with trade secret law and the objectives of each of these laws do not necessarily conflict.
One commentator has asserted that, if the elements of the common law or state statute
violation are different in kind from patent or copyright infringement, Sears and Compco
will not be applicable, but will operate only "to preempt any rights [granted] under the
1981] 211
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plication. 46 In the look-alike drug context, most courts have fash-
ioned remedies based on palming off,47 and copying of trade
dress,'8 thus avoiding the Sears-Compco limitations. The language
in Compco 49 indicates that the Sears-Compco doctrine refers only
to preemption of state laws and is not addressed to rights which
are granted or recognized under other federal laws. 50 Thus, courts
have also applied the traditional unfair competition standards of
nonfunctionality and secondary meaning, which have been codified
under federal law in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, in affording
protection against copying.51
STATUTORY PROTECTION UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
Since Sears and Compco, protection against copying the product
itself appears to be no longer available under common law or state
unfair competition laws. Plaintiff, therefore, must seek relief
against unprivileged imitation elsewhere. The Lanham Act pro-
vides for federal registration of a trademark which distinguishes
the goods of the applicant from those of others.52 Trademark pro-
tection is afforded to the distinguishing mark that a seller affixes
to his goods." Trademark registration, therefore, will not be
common law or statute's of a state that are equivalent to copyright or patent and that ex-
tend to works or articles coming within the scope of those federal laws .... Dannay, supra
note 43, at 142-43.
46. Dannay, supra note 43, at 143.
47. See Marion Laboratories, Inc. v. Michigan Pharmacal Corp., 338 F. Supp. 762, 769
(E.D. Mich. 1972), affd without opinion, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973) (the court noted that
Sears and Compco specifically mentioned that palming off was an area where states can
continue to impose liability under state unfair competition laws).
48. Marion Laboratories, Inc. v. Michigan Pharmacal Corp., 338 F. Supp. 762, 766 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), affd without opinion, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973) (the color of plaintiff's
capsule is an element of its trade dress, an area left to state regulation under Sears and
Compco).
49. "If the design is not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory protec-
tion. . . ." 376 U.S. at 238.
50. Dannay, supra note 43, at 144.
51. See SK&F v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980);
Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equipment
Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
For an argument that federal unfair competition laws that use the same standards as the
state laws that were found to frustrate the procompetition goals of federal patent laws are
equally hostile to those goals, see Comment, Generic Drug Laws and Unfair Competition
Claims Under the Lanham Act - An Uneasy Alliance: Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby
Drug Co., 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 227 (1980) [hereinafter cited as An Uneasy Alliance].
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976).
53. Section 32 of the Lanham Act provides the owner of a registered trademark with a
right of action against
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granted for a mark that is merely descriptive of a product5" or that
is not indicative of the source of the product.55
Although a particular color design or shape of a distinctive na-
ture might be eligible for trademark registration," most look-alike
drugs do not involve such features as have been traditionally
trademarkable.57 Plaintiffs can, however, seek protection under
Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Section 32 of the Lanham Act
The protection afforded by section 32 is narrower than that con-
ferred by section 43(a). s It relates only to infringement of the
trademark itself and thus would apply only to cases where the reg-
istered trademark or a confusingly similar one had been used by
someone other than the registrant.5' For the large number of un-
trademarked capsules, therefore, this section appears to offer little
protection.
Under the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement,
however, one who actively shares a retailer's infringement of the
trademark is also liable under section 32.60 Despite the ostensible
Any person who shall, without consent of the registrant - (a) use in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in con-
nection with the sale. . . of any goods. . . with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ...
15 U.S.C. § 1.114 (1976). See Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1979) (manufacturer would be liable under § 32 if it suggested, even if only by implication,
that a druggist fill a bottle with the generic product and apply the brand name (trademark)
to the label, or continued to sell the generic product that facilitated this to a druggist whom
it knew or had reason to know was doing this).
54. Section 2 of the Lanham Act provides:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration . . . unless it - . . . (e) Consists of a
mark which, (1) when applied to the goods . . . is merely descriptive . . . of
them ....
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976).
55. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (the term "shredded
wheat" describes a type of cereal product and, without more, may not acquire trademark
protection).
56. For example, Lemmon Pharmacal's color-specked tablets, Eli Lilly's bullet-shaped
capsules, and Parke-Davis' color-banded capsules are federally registered trademarks.
Cooper, supra note 20, at 2.
57. Swenson, supra note 25, at 361. To date, no U.S. trademark registration has been
granted for a conventionally shaped tablet or capsule or a capsule merely using two different
colors. Id. at 361. But see note 56 supra.
58. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 636 (2d Cir. 1979).
59. Id.
60. Contributory infringement has been found in cases where one places the infringing
label on the goods before delivering them to the retailer. John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L.
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requirement that the contributory conduct be active, some courts
would find liability for contributory infringement where a manu-
facturer or wholesaler had only suggested that a retailer fill a pre-
scription with the generic product and apply another's trademark
to the label."1 Liability has been found even where the defendant
merely sold the generic product which facilitated covert substitu-
tion to a pharmacist whom the manufacturer or wholesaler knew or
should have known was engaging in such practices.62
A recent Second Circuit decision, currently pending before the
Supreme Court, is an example of this extended liability. In Ives
Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co.,63 the circuit court found that
defendants' use of identically colored, look-alike drug capsules
should have been reasonably anticipated to induce pharmacists to
Stetson Co., 85 F.2d 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 605 (1936) (if the defendant partic-
ipates in the manufacture of hats which carry the infringing mark, it is an infringer of the
trademark); Andrew Jergens Co. v. Bonded Products Corp., 21 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1927), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 572 (1928) (defendant is liable for contributory infringement even though
it only manufactured the product which was deceptively sold as plaintiff's product which it
knew plaintiff was manufacturing and selling). One who knowingly and deliberately insti-
gates a retailer's infringement of the trademark is also liable. See Stix Products, Inc. v.
United Merchants and Manufacturers, 295 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
61. Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957) (sale by defendant manufacturer
to a druggist, with the suggestion that the product sold could be substituted for a competi-
tor's product, is itself a type of palming off); Marion Laboratories, Inc. v. Michigan Pharma-
cal Corp., 338 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (liability will be found if plaintiff can show
that defendant suggested and encouraged the palming off of its product). See also Smith,
Kline & French Laboratories v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1946).
62. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981) (manufacturer
liable if it continued to sell capsules containing the generic drug which facilitated passing off
by a druggist whom it knew or had reason to know was engaging in such practices); SK&F,
Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980) (actionable for
a drug manufacturer to put a product in the hands of a pharmacist in a form in which the
manufacturer can reasonably anticipate that it may be passed off as another product even if
the manufacturer does nothing else to encourage passing off); A.H. Robins Co. v. Medicine
Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (anyone who puts goods into the
hands of dealers for sale to the public which contain the means for deceiving purchasers,
and/or which can be reasonably anticipated to so deceive, is subject to an injunction).
63. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 601
F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction), 488 F. Supp. 394, rev'd,
638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3266 (Oct 13, 1981).
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and will be asked to decide whether § 32 grants
a trademark owner monopoly rights in the color(s) of its product; whether a manufacturer or
wholesaler of generic drugs is liable for contributory trademark infringement based on a
finding that the use of look-alikes assisted druggists in mislabeling and that they could rea-
sonably have anticipated that the use of look-alikes facilitated such practice; and whether
generic drug manufacturers and wholesalers should be enjoined from using the colors of a
brand name drug product in manufacturing and marketing generics. 50 U.S.L.W. 3266 (Oct.
13, 1981).
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covertly substitute the generic product for the trademarked brand-
name drug.64 The generic manufacturers and suppliers had con-
tributed, the court found, to the pharmacist's infringement of the
brand name by packaging the generic product in look-alike cap-
sules." Thus, although the section 32 remedy was designed to pro-
tect the trademarked name of the product, the holding has the ef-
fect of extending trademark protection to the size, shape, and color
of brand-name drugs, even where such features are themselves not
trademarked under section 32 of the Lanham Act.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Section 43(a) creates a federal statutory claim of unfair competi-
tion.66 It has been construed to include the imitation of any non-
-functional features of a competitor's product which have acquired
secondary meaning.7 Elements necessary for recovery under the
section 43(a) remedy are codifications of the common law of unfair
competition: (1) the nonfunctional features must be shown to be so
distinctive in design or general appearance as to identity the
source of the product; (2) purchasers are induced to buy the prod-
uct because of the identification of source; and (3) secondary
meaning had already been established when the imitator intro-
duced his copy to the public.68
64. The court suggested that the simplest way to reduce illegal substitution and mis-
labelling would be to require that generic drugs be sold in a form which does not resemble
the trademarked product. 638 F.2d at 545. The court reasoned that this would alert the
consumer to the possibility that he or she has been given the generic when the doctor had
specifically prescribed the trademarked product, as well as give notice that the lower cost of
the generic should have been charged if that in fact was what was given. Id.
65. Id. at 543.
66. Section 43(a) provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or
any false description or representation . . . shall be liable to a civil action . . . by
any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1976). See SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625
F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980) (§ 43(a) creates a federal statutory tort of unfair competition be-
yond simple trademark infringement and is broad enough to include the tort of unprivileged
imitation, the imitation of any nonfunctional physical details of a competitor's product that
have acquired a secondary meaning.)
67. See SK&F v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980);
Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby"Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equipment
Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
68. 3 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES, § 77.4(e)(2) (3d
ed. 1969).
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Color has traditionally been found to be essential to the com-
mercial success of a product and, therefore, functional.6 9 A finding
of functionality precludes protection of the color.7 0 A finding of
functionality of color has been based on the argument that many
elderly patients associate the appearance of the drug with its ther-
apeutic effect and, therefore, refuse to take equivalent drugs in
capsules of a different color.7 1 Others have argued, albeit unsuc-
cessfully, that the size, shape, and color of drugs assist in identify-
ing drugs in an emergency situation, and in identifying medica-
tions patients have previously taken.2 Several recent cases,
however, have found that the color of the drug was nonfunctional,
thus giving plaintiff an opportunity to show secondary meaning. 78
Secondary meaning necessary for trademark protection can be
established by evidence of extensive sales and advertising.7 Often
size, shape, and color of a drug are the sole means of identifying
the producer.75 Most of the courts holding color non-functional
69. See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924); Norwich
Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959); Smith, Kline & French
Laboratories v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1946).
70. The court in In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961), held that
functional features would not be registered under the Act, even if they had acquired secon-
dary meaning. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals found that the public's right to
copy functional featurss was necessary in the interests of effective competition. Id. at 504.
71. See, e.g., SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1061
(3d Cir. 1980); Ives Laboratories, Inc., v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 950 (E.D.N.Y.
1978).
72. See Smith, Kline & French Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d
1055, 1060 (3d Cir. 1980); Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Labs, 502 PATENT
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-1, A-2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 1980).
73. See SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.
1980); Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Laboratories, 502 PATENT TRADEMARK
AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), A-1 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 1980); Hoffman La Roche, Inc., v. Premo
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 502 PATENT TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-4
(D.N.J. Oct. 30, 1980); A.H. Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015
(E.D. Mo. 1980); Marion Laboratories, Inc. v. Michigan Pharmacal Corp., 338 F. Supp. 762
(E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd. without opinion, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).These courts found
color to be part of the product's trade dress, not part of medicine, but it has been argued
that color and shape of a drug capsule are part of the product itself. Brief for United States,
As Amicus Curiae, Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., No. 78-7454 (2d Cir. 1978), 416
PATENT TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-5 and D-1 (Feb. 15, 1979), at D-4 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief).
74. See, e.g., La Maur, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 496 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 902 (1974); A.H. Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1015 (E.D. Mo. 1980). See also E. KITCH and H. PERLMAx, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COM-
PETITIVE PROCEss 294 (2d ed. 1979).
75. Even where the drug capsule is labeled as to manufacturer, logos would necessarily
be so small as to be ineffective to prevent confusion as to source or passing off. See SK&F
Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1980).
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have also found that the size, shape, and color had acquired secon-
dary meaning. 6
The brand-name plaintiff must show not only that the size,
shape, and color of the drug are non-functional and have acquired
secondary meaning, but, in addition, that the buyer's motivation in
purchasing the copy was caused by this confusion. This motiva-
tional element makes it more difficult to prove secondary meaning
in an action for unfair competition than in a trademark infringe-
ment action, where there is no motivational element.7 ' Because of
the unique practices involved in marketing prescription drugs, it is
almost impossible to prove that the consumer was motivated by
source association. In contrast to the normal buyer-seller relation-
ship there are three parties involved in the purchase of a prescrip-
tion drug: the physician, the pharmacist and the patient.79 Those
who choose the product do not buy it and those who buy it do not
choose it.80 Purchasers of prescription drugs are, in reality, captive
consumers."' Physicians decide what product to prescribe, in what
quantity, and with what frequency.82
The traditional standard of secondary meaning/likelihood of
confusion, which focuses on purchaser motivation, seems therefore,
inappropriate in the prescription drug context.88 Yet courts con-
tinue to apply this standard, even while noting consumer passive-
ness in purchasing these products." Some courts circumvent this
element by finding a likelihood of confusion, even though it was
76. See SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.
1980); Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Laboratories, Inc., 502 PATENT
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-1 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 1980); Hoffman La Roche Labo-
ratories, Inc., v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 502 PATENT TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-4 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 1980); A.H. Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp.,
206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
77. See American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1601 (1980); Lucien LeLong, Inc. v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395
(2d Cir. 1947); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917);
Competitive Torts, supra note 21, at 912-913 (1964).
78. See Competitive Torts, supra note 21, at 911-912.
79. Swenson, supra note 25, at 362.
80. McCarey, supra note 6, at 103.
81. 1972 Hearings, supra note 1, at 2.
82. Id.
83. An Uneasy Alliance, supra note 51, at 255.
84. See, e.g., Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190,
195 (9th Cir. 1953); Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Waldman, 69 F. Supp. 646, 648
(E.D. Pa. 1946); But see Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 947
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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not the ultimate consumer who was likely to be confused.88 Courts
are diluting the traditional standards of unfair competition result-
ing in protection of size, shape, and color. More appropriate stan-
dards by which to measure relief are therefore necessary.
POLICIES IN FAVOR OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION
Consumer's Right to Know
Patients today want more information about the drugs pre-
scribed for them. A 1975 study, for example, found that a signifi-
cant number of patients surveyed wanted to know the reasons for
the drug's use, and to be informed of the common risks involved,
of the risk of over-dosage, under-dosage or not using the drug, and
of other important issues regarding the drug."" Public policy favor-
ing protection of the consumer's right to know is evidenced by the
"duty to warn' 87 of the risks associated with a drug, FDA ingredi-
ent labeling requirements," and the trademark laws themselves.
Look-alike drugs are, by definition, virtually indistinguishable
from brand-name drugs. This prevents consumers from obtaining
crucial information. For example, the basic premise of those advo-
cating generic imitation, that all chemically equivalent drugs are
qualitatively and therapeutically equivalent regardless of their
source, has been vigorously challenged by the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (PMA), physicians, and pharmacists.89
A government study on drug bioequivalency stated that well-docu-
mented and significant differences in bioavailability have been
demonstrated in chemically-equivalent products.'0 The danger in
85. See SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1184
(D.N.J. 1979) (allowed plaintiffs to show secondary meaning/likelihood of confusion in the
minds of the physicians prescribing the drug); Hoffman LaRoche, Inc. v. Premo Pharmaceu-
tical Laboratories, Inc., 502 PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)A-4 (D.N.J. Oct.
30, 1980) (merely found that the imitation was very likely to cause confusion such that it
would be mistaken for plaintiff's product).
86. The result of a 1975 study by Joubert and Lasagna. Report of the Committee on
S.1075, supra note 3, at 22.
87. See Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975).
88. 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(g) (1); 352(e), (n) (1980).
89. For an extensive authority supporting this contention, see Ball, supra note 6, at 480
n.38.
90. OTA Report, supra note 5, at 11.
"Bioavailability" refers to a measurement of the rate and extent to which an administered
drug reaches general circulation in the blood stream. Two drugs are "chemically equivalent"
when they contain the same amount of the same active ingredients; two chemically
equivalent drugs are considered "bioequivalent" when they result in the same bioavailability
when administered in the same amount to the same individual.
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having a prescription filled with a look-alike drug that is not bioe-
quivalent is that the product may be either subpotent, and there-
fore ineffective, or too powerful.91 With look-alike drug capsules,
consumers having prescriptions refilled may be misled into think-
ing that they are being given medicine from the same, original, re-
liable source.
In addition, there may be more fundamental problems involving
drug quality. A study on drug product safety concluded that drug
products from different manufacturers differed in quality in sev-
eral respects and that these differences may lead to substantial dif-
ferences in therapeutic effect and/or safety.2 A government study
has confirmed that pharmaceutical manufacturing processes are
not standardized.93 Variations affecting purity, potency, stability
and dissolution time may frequently occur depending upon differ-
ing procedures for quality control. 4 These findings demonstrate
that random substitution of a generic look-alike is not in the best
interest of the consumer. In fact, the disparity in manufacturer
performance as reflected in an independent study has prompted
one commentator to- recommend pharmacist review of individual
Two chemically equivalent drugs are considered "therapeutically equivalent" if they re-
sult in the same therapeutic response when administered in the same amount to the same
individual. See OTA Report, supra note 5, at vi; REMINGTON'S PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES
1368 (5th ed. 1975).
Although two drug products may contain the same active ingredient, each manufacturer
uses different excipients (inactive ingredients) in the manufacturing process which can cause
differences in bioequivalency/bioavailability affecting the safety and efficacy of the drug.
See United States v. Generix Drug Corp., Nos. 80-5652, 80-5856 and 80-5857 (5th Cir.,
Sept. 4. 1981); United States v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 958
(D.N.J. 1981).
91. For example, the brand-name drug, "Dimetapp Extentabs", releases its active ingre-
dients within a 10 - 12 hour period, while the generic look-alike releases its active ingredi-
ents within 3 - 4 hours. A.H. Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015,
1019 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
Certain patients are particularly vulnerable to therapeutic inequivalency problems. See E.
W. MARTIN, HAZARDS OF MEDICATION 94 (2d ed. 1978) (those with allergies, metabolic defi-
ciencies, and special problems of absorption, distribution and excretion). In those cases,
when a particular brand of drug is well-tolerated by the patient, safe and effective therapy
depends on that specific product being dispensed.
92. American Pharmaceutical Assoc., Academy of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Drug Prod-
uct Quality, 10 J. AM. PHARM. Ass'N. 107, 116 (1970). See also L. Block, An Evaluation of
Drug Product Citations in the FDA Weekly Reports Between 1970 and 1978, 3 CoNTEMPo-
RARY PHARMACY PRACTICE 3, at 173 (Summer 1980) [hereinafter cited as Block]. Almost
3,300 human drug and drug product citations published in the FDA's weekly reports be-
tween 1970 and 1978 were collated and processed. These citations represent the only public
record of quality control lapses in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Id. at 171.
93. OTA Report, supra note 5, at 34.
94. Id. at 27.
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manufacturer FDA records prior to purchase to ensure buying only
from those who appear to have a good FDA record.96 Obvious
product differentiation helps the consumer determine that he or
she is receiving products of a desirable manufacturer. Denial of
protection results in drugs of the least conscientious manufacturer
in the industry indistinguishable in the marketplace from those of
the manufacturer who strives for the highest standards of quality.
Finally, the economic policy underlying generic substitution is
that of reducing drug prices for consumers. When a look-alike ge-
neric is substituted for a brand-name drug, a consumer may be un-
aware of the substitution and may be charged the higher brand-
name price." Prohibition of generic copying makes covert substitu-
tion more difficult and increases the likelihood of the consumer
knowing whether the brand-name or the generic has been used to
fill the prescription.
Protection of Brand-Name Manufacturers
The look-alike issue raises serious questions of product liability.
Brand-name manufacturers have pointed out the potential diffi-
culty of assessing liability where a patient has suffered injury
caused by a substituted look-alike product and then filed suit
against the brand-name manufacturer.9 Recent decisions allowing
DES victims to sue unidentifiable manufacturers have highlighted
this problem."8 Allowing generic look-alikes renders producer iden-
tification almost impossible to the user and leaves the larger
brand-name manufacturers vulnerable to lawsuits, whether or not
95. Block, supra note 92, at 175.
96. See Cooper, supra note 20, at 31 n. 111 (a survey revealed that a Washington, D.C.,
pharmacy dispensed inexpensive look-alike generics in place of the more expensive brand-
name drug without informing the consumer and, in most cases, without passing on any sav-
ings to the consumer, despite considerably lower acquisition costs by the pharmacy); Swen-
son, supra note 25, at 368 (if pharmacists are passing on cost savings to consumers, it fol-
lows they should be eager to inform them about the substitution).
97. 578 SCRIP: WORLD PHARMACEutIcAL NEWS 10 (April 1, 1981).
98. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980), cert. denied,
49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (Oct. 14, 1980): (adopted a variation on the alternative liability tort theory
- the market share theory); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S. 2d 625
(1981) (the specific problems presented by the widespread use of generic drugs which render
identification almost impossible to the user, cannot be allowed to prevent valid recoveries,
nor to allow some manufacturers to escape their liability altogether by means of a shroud of
anonymity). But see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass. 1981) (court held
that traditional tort theories do not apply and refused to fashion novel legal theories, but
recognized that the response to the problem must come from the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, not from a federal district court.)
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they were in fact responsible for the injury.
In addition, where generic manufacturers use the same size,
shape, and color of the brand-name drug, covert substitution is fa-
cilitated, if not actually encouraged.99 Because of this, the brand-
name manufacturers' economic return may be eroded. A dimin-
ished economic return may cause the manufacturer to respond by
limiting allocation to areas beneficial to the consumer, such as
product development or quality control. 100 The manufacturer has
significant economic investments Which deserve protection.
POLICIES IN FAVOR OF No PROTECTION
The growth and vitality of generic manufacturers is the result, in
large part, of the steady government support over the past decade.
This support has come from the Department of Justice, 10 1 The
Food and Drug Administration,0 the Federal Trade Commis-
99. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3266 (Oct. 13, 1981).
100. The continuing development of new drugs and the improvement of those already in
existence are goals that must be fostered in the best interest of the public. Recent studies
have shown that the costs of such research and development has risen from $54 million in
1976 to $70 million in 1979, and 75% of these new drugs marketed yield yearly sales that
are significantly less than the annual research and development cost of developing a new
drug. It has been estimated that most new drugs require more than twenty years to accumu-
late sales as large as the estimated cost of bringing them to market. Although most of these
drugs are protected by patents for 17 years, there are significant marketing delays due to
FDA pre-market review. This has resulted in less and less of a drug's patent life remaining
by the time it reaches the market. If little opportunity remains to recover research expendi-
ture, the stimulus to invest in these increasingly expensive but vital therapeutic areas will
disappear.
Two recent studies conducted jointly by Professor J. Weston of UCLA's Graduate School
of Management and Dr. J. Virts, a staff economist with Eli Lilly Co., highlight the increas-
ing costs of research and development in the research-intensive portion of the U.S. pharma-
ceutical industry. See 555 SCRIP: WORLD PHARMACEUTICAL NEWS 8 (Jan. 12, 1981).
101. The Department of Justice, in an amicus curiae brief for defendants in a look-alike
case, stressed that freedom to copy the product of a competitor is fundamental in a compet-
itive economy. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 73 at D-2. It advocated the views of econo-
mists who envision a system in which standardized methods of production will ensure that
the goods of all producers will be completely interchangeable. These economists consider
that protection from imitation is, in essence, protection of a monopoly. Allowing imitation,
on the other hand, is a step toward "purifying competition" by elimination of monopoly
elements. Where goods are copied, they are more nearly standardized and, if successful, the
rationale is that the originator will be more likely to lower prices to compete with the imita-
tor. For a more complete discussion, see Ball, supra note 6; see also J. ROBINSON, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933); E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION (1948).
102. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has promulgated regulations that place
additional burdens upon pharmaceutical manufacturers in the selection and use of trade-
marks. See 21 CFR § 201.10(c)(3) (1981); 21 CFR § 201.6(b) (1981).
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sion,103 and various legislation. 104 Although this support has come
from many sources, it is commonly the result of the public policy
encouraging the fostering of competition.
Proponents of copying have found additional support in judicial
decisions which have recognized the economic desirability of al-
lowing imitation. While having little sympathy for the willful imi-
tator, courts have nevertheless found that copying must be permit-
ted.105 The United States Supreme Court in the Sears and Compco
decisions, balancing the national policy favoring free competition
and the policy granting limited patent monopolies, also recognized
the importance of allowing copying to promote competition.1
This single public policy is indeed a powerful argument in favor of
granting no protection to size, shape, or color.
Generic manufacturers point to the trade protection already
granted to brand-name manufacturers through patent protec-
tion.1 07 With this protection, brand-name manufacturers are, at-
103. The authors of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report determined that the use
of pharmaceutical trademarks (brand-names) ensured market dominance by brand-name
companies and proposed limiting all pharmaceutical trademarks to a single 20 year term. B.
BOND & D. LEAN, SALES, PROMOTION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN TWO PRESCRIPTION
DRUG MARKETS (FTC Bureau of Economics 1977) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]. When
the patent on a particular drug expires, therefore, competitors would be free to copy not
only the chemical formula, but the trademarked name, thus denying the pharmaceutical
industry the trademark protection afforded others. See generally Comment, The FTC and
the Generic Doctrine: A New Rx for Pharmaceutical Trademarks, 15 TULSA L.J. 327 (1979);
FTC REPORT, supra; Dixon, Trademarks, the Federal Trade Commission and the Lanham
Act, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 463 (1978); 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
§ 12.1 at 405-06 (1973).
104. For example, the Kefauver Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act reduced the importance of trademarks for prescription drugs by mandating the use, size
and placement of generic terms in labelling and in advertising. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (e)(1)(1962).
These amendments sought to encourage physicians to prescribe by generic rather than
brand name. See Note, Drug Amendments of 1962 - Generic-Name Prescribing: Drug Price
Panacea?, 16 STAN. L. REv. 649, 653-655 (1964).
105. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Disapproval of the
copyist's opportunism may be an understandable first reaction, but this initial response to
the problem has been curbed in deference to the greater public good."); American Safety
Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[Tlhe bare imitation of another's
product, without more, is permissible. And this is true regardless of the fact that the courts
have little sympathy for a willful imitator."); Millinery Creators' Guild v. FTC, 109 F2d
175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940) ("Courts have refrained from enjoining the pirate because they will
not support a monopoly in an unpatented idea.")
106. 376 U.S. at 230-31.
107. Patent restoration legislation is currently under consideration in Congress. Sen.
Mathias' patent bill (S.255), providing drugs with up to seven years of additional patent
protection to compensate for marketing delays due to the time it takes to get FDA approval,
cleared the Senate Judiciary Committee, 43 FDC REP. 21, at 6 (May 25, 1981), but Senators
Kennedy and Metzenbaum maintain that the bill is not in the public interest. 43 FDC REP.
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guably, given a sufficient period of time to recoup their investment.
Generic drug manufacturers have received more recent encour-
agement from the government policy concerning new drug applica-
tions.10 8 This is further manifestation of government encourage-
ment of greater -competition in the prescription drug industry, and
indirectly supports the generic manufacturer's argument that look-
alike drugs are necessary for optimal competition.
CONCLUSION
Trademarks have traditionally been used as an identification of
origin or source of a product in the marketplace. They are a practi-
cal means of distinguishing between the source of products which
have given satisfaction in the past and those that have not.
Whether or not a consumer actually knows the name of the pro-
ducer or simply recognizes the trademark, the mark serves as an
assurance that the product originates from a specific source and
the result is the same. The reputation of that particular producer
25, at 5 (June 22, 1981). "Over the last decade the average time for NDA [new drug applica-
tion] approval has remained at 2-3 years but total time from IND [investigational new drug]
filing to NDA approval has continued to increase. In 1976 it stood at 9 years." Industry
Perspectives of the Drug Lag 4, Address by Norman Pitts, M.D., Vice President of Clinical
Research at Pfizer Laboratories, Inc., 1981 Associates of Clinical Pharmacology Annual
Meeting in New Orleans, La. (March 19-20, 1981).
108. For a new drug to be approved, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and FDA
regulations require that an NDA (new drug application) contain full reports of clinical in-
vestigations made to show the safety and efficacy of a drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1980); 21
CFR § 314.1 (c)(12) (1981). The NDA process is often expensive and time consuming. An
NDA for a duplicate drug, however, may be approved on the basis of independently pub-
lished studies, not actually duplicated by the manufacturer itself. 21 CFR § 314.1(c) (12) (e)
(1981). This policy is known as the "paper NDA". Many generic drug manufacturers, there-
fore, may take advantage of another's research when making a drug application.
The consumer is affected where the studies forming the basis of the paper NDA were not
necessarily performed using the same inactive ingredients or under the same manufacturing
conditions. Significant differences in strength, purity and efficacy of the duplicate drug are
therefore possible.
A more dangerous situation occurs where a generic manufacturer distributes unapproved
look-alike drugs (no paper NDA) claiming that they are not "new" drugs under the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act because they are "generally recognized as safe and effective."
21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1976). See United States v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc.,
511 F. Supp. 958 (D.N.J. 1981) (generic versions of previously approved products are new
drugs because they contain different excipients than their pioneer counterparts, thus leading
to possible bioavailability/bioequivalency problems). But see United States v. Generix Drug
Corp., Nos. 80-5652, 80-5856 and 80-5857 (5th Cir., Sept. 4, 1981) (while it may be good
public policy to regulate bioavailability and bioequivalency of generic drugs through a new
drug application, the statutory language of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does
not require such approval. "New drug" applies only to the active ingredient of a drug
product).
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will be an essential factor in the consumer's ultimate decision of
whether or not to choose that product.
Although colors themselves traditionally have not been entitled
to any protection because of fear of monopolization, recent court
decisions have recognized that the choice of colors for drugs is
myriad. Size, shape, and color of a new drug are chosen for tradi-
tional trademark purposes: to indicate the producer and to distin-
guish the drug from those of other producers. These features are a
form of "commercial signature" merely facilitating the protection
of a producer's good will in the marketplace by distinguishing the
product from that of others.10' Where the medicinal component of
a drug is not inherently colored, the choice of color is arbitrary and
does not prevent another manufacturer from producing the same
drug. There should be, therefore, no bar to trademark registration.
Finally, it is in the public interest to maintain individual iden-
tity in trade: the consumer is assured of getting the product s/he
wants and the merchant is assured of realizing the results of his or
her enterprise.110
In today's market, with increased consumer awareness and phar-
macist responsbility, a quality generic can compete openly and
honestly for a share of the market. By affording trademark protec-
tion to size, shape and color of prescription drugs, a manufacturer
can compete with others in terms of its own reputation, its own
products and its own private identity.1
KATHLEEN M. SHEAHAN
109. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918).
110. Pattishall, supra note 15, at 971.
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